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SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS
Carlos E. Lazarus*
SEiziN v. TRANSMISSION OF INHEMRrANCE UPON DEATH
In Knighten v. Ruffin,1 the testatrix, who was the record
owner of a half interest in the property involved in the litiga-
gation, had made a testament bequeathing "all of her real prop-
erty" and "the fixtures contained in [her] residence" to her son
Calip and to her granddaughter Lillie, "one-half to each, share
and share alike." When the testatrix died, Calip, who was the
record owner of the other one-half of the property and who had
no knowledge of the existence of the testament, caused himself
to be recognized as the sole heir of the deceased, and as such,
sent into possession of his mother's interest in the property,
and, on the same day, mortgaged the same. Within four months
thereafter, Lillie filed a petition for the probate of the testa-
ment 2 and afterwards filed suit against Calip to have the judg-
ment of possession in favor of Calip amended and to be recog-
nized as the owner in indivision of one-fourth of the property.
The judgment rendered in her favor in that suit also recognized
Calip as the owner of the other three-fourths. Meanwhile, the
mortgagee had foreclosed on its mortgage, had bought the prop-
erty at the sheriff's sale, and had conveyed the same to one
Ruffin against whom Lillie filed this suit asserting her rights
to her undivided one-fourth interest in the property, presumably
on the theory that, as to that portion, the mortgage executed by
Calip was ineffective. The court of appeal, reversing the lower
court, used article 940 of the Civil Code as the basis for its
decision and held that Lillie, as the universal legatee of the
de cujus, had become "seized of her interest" in the property
upon the death of the testatrix and that, this being the case, the
defendant Ruffin could not invoke the laws of registry in his
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 255 So.2d 388 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971) writ denied, 260 La. 399, 256
So.2d 288 (1972).
2. This petition appears to have been filed timely under the provisions
of IA. COD Civ. P. article 2893: "No testament shall be admitted to probate
unless a petition therefor has been filed . . . within five years of the judicial
opening of the succession of the deceased."
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favor.8 On rehearing, however, the court recognized its error
in characterizing Lillie as a universal legatee when she was
actually only a legatee under universal title, but it nevertheless
held that as a "testamentary heir" she was nonetheless entitled
to the benefits of article 940.4
It would have been more correct to say that Lillie, as a
legatee under universal title, acquired the ownership of her
legacy immediately upon the death of the testatrix by virtue
of articles 1613 and 1626 of the Civil Code for, actually, a uni-
versal legatee has no seizin in the proper signification of the
term inasmuch as legatees under universal title are bound to
demand the delivery of their legacies from those that have the
seizin.5 It is suggested, therefore, that Lillie became the owner
of her legacy immediately upon the death of the testatrix, not
because she became "seized of her interest in the property," but
because of that other provision of the Civil Code providing that
every legatee, regardless of the kind of legacy he receives, ac-
quires the ownership of the thing bequeathed from the day of
testator's death.0 The difficulty seems to stem from a miscon-
ception of the meaning and of the role of "seizin" in the law
of successions. Perhaps the following brief remarks might serve
to shed some light in this area of the law which, in this writer's
opinion, has remained much confused for too long a time.
At Roman law, a succession was regarded as a fictitious
entity representing the deceased until delivery of the effects
3. The court cites and quotes with approval from Bishop 0. Copeland,
222 La. 284, 62 So.2d 486 (1952), in which it is held that the law of registry
of articles 2251-66 of the Louisiana Civil Code is not applicable when the
ownership of or the claim affecting the immovable has vested in the claim-
ant by operation of law.
4. It is Interesting to note that in refusing writs, one of the justices of
the supreme court stated that although the application filed by Ruffin pre-
sented a "most interesting and important question" which was res nova,
and that although the majority of the court were of the "firm opinion that
the legal basis of the Court of Appeal's decision was erroneous," the writs
were being denied because the court was also "convinced that the result
reached was correct under another theory of law," but he does not indicate
what that other theory Is. See Knighten v. Ruffin, 260 La. 399, 256 So.2d
288 (1972). The justice also indicates that the court would have "affirmed
the judgment of the Court of Appeal under Code of Civil Procedure Article
2893." But if the rule announced in the Bishop case, supra, is correct and
is applicable to the factual situation presented, it is difficult to see how
the procedural article would have any bearing in the case since the plain-
tiff had timely filed her petition for probate.
5. See LA. Civ. CoDs art. 1613.
6. LA. CIv. Coos art. 1626.
[Vol. 33
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of which it was composed to the heir of the de cujus. It was
therefore necessary for the heir to apply for and be sent judi-
cially into possession of the inheritance. 7 This concept, which
was adopted in the Digest of 18088 presumably through the Par-
tidas,9 was abrogated by the redactors of the Code of 1825 who
professed to adopt and to substitute in its place the system
whereby the heir would become, not only the proprietor of the
inheritance at the moment of the death, but would also be in-
vested with the possession thereof so that the heir would not
need to apply to the courts for possession.'0 Such is the French
system which embodies two different concepts: (1) that the heir
becomes the owner of the inheritance from the moment of the
the death, and (2) that the legitimate heir is "seized" thereof
from the moment of the death. Under the French system
"seizin" means, therefore, not the acquisition of the ownership
of the inheritance, for this ownership is transmitted to the heir
and is acquired by him by operation of law, whether he has the
seizin or not;'1 but rather, as Marcad6 expresses it, it means
7. "Since it often falls out that the Inheritance remains for some time
without a Master, either because he who ought to succeed is absent, or
that he deliberates whether he shall accept or renounce the Inheritance,
and that during these intervals, it may happen that some Right may accrue
to the Succession, or that it may be engaged In new charges, or other
affairs, the said Inheritance is therefore considered as holding the place
of Master, and as representing the deceased to whom the Goods did belong."
1 DOMAT, THE CIVIL LAW IN ITS NATURAL ORD=e, 561 (Strahan transl. 1772).
8. "Until acceptance or renunciation, the inheritance is considered as a
fictitious being representing in every respect the deceased who was the
owner of the estate." La. Digest of 1808, bk. III, tit. I, art. 74.
9. LAS SIET'E PARTIDAS, bk. 6, tit. 6, L. 11, & bk. 6, tit. 14, L. 1 (1252).
10. "By the Roman law and by the Spanish, the transmission of the
succession did not take effect until the acceptance of the heir; that accep-
tance had merely a retroactive effect from [sic] the death of the deceased.
The heir was also obliged to apply to the judge to be put into possession,
on which subject the Partidas contain a whole title. Part. 6, tit. 14.
"We have thought it best to adopt the rule which vests the rights of
the heir from the moment of the death of the deceased; which is also in
accordance with the other dispositions of our Code, which dispense with
the necessity of the heirs applying to the judge for an order to be put into
possession, and give him the right of transmitting to his heir, the succes-
sion acquired by him even if he dies before he has accepted it." Comment
by Redactors, P1oJST oF THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE OF 1825, 1 LA. LEGAL AR-
CHIVES 115 (1939).
11. See 9 AUBRY Err RAU ET ESMEIN, DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS § 609 (6th ed.
1954) in LAZARUS, 4 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS 100 (1971). In note 14 of the text,
the author has this to say: "The origin of the concept of seizin remains
obscure. It seems, however, that in our ancient law the term seizin desig-
nated neither the ownership nor the possession, but the faculty of claim-
ing and exercising possession. III RIPERT ET BOULANFR no. 2204. In any
case, under the present law, seizin does not signify the acquisition o the
ownership of the hereditary property, for this ownership is transmitted by
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the. legal investiture of possession so that, upon the death of the
de cujus the heir with seizin, i.e., the legitimate heir, is also
deemed to be in possession thereof and is thus entitled, from
the instant of death, to bring all the actions which the de cujus
could have brought, including the possessory one.12
Although not as clearly formulated as they might have
been, the pertinent articles of the Louisiana Civil Code do in
effect make this distinction between the actual transmission of
the inheritance to the heir, and the possession thereof which is
rightfully deemed to be in the legitimate heir, although not
actually so. Thus, article 940 speaks of the acquisition of the
inheritance by the heir immediately upon the death of the de-
ceased,18 whereas articles 942 and 943 speak of the possession
thereof which is continued in the person of the heir "with all
its 'defects as well as all its advantages, the change of proprietor
producing no alteration in the nature of the possession.'14
In Louisiana, as in France, the seizin or constructive posses-
sion is given first to the forced heir of the deceased, in default
of whom, it is given to the universal legatee, if any, and lastly,
to the other legitimate heirs of the deceased in default of the
operation of law to the successors who have no seizin as well as to those
who have it .... Nor does it signify the transmission of the possession....
For those having the seizin, it consists only of the faculty of taking the
hereditary property and of exercising the actions of the deceased, without
any previous authorization from other successors or from the judge." (Em-
phasis added.)
12. "To begin with, the legitimate heirs have the seizin, that is to say
that they have, by operation of law, the legal investiture of the possession;
so that, by the death of the deceased, they become, not only the owners,
but also the possessors of the property left by him. Thus, from the instant
of death, they are entitled to all possessory actions, and any prescriptions
running in favor of the deceased continues to run for their benefit without
interruption. Such was the sense of the old maxim: 'Le mort salsit le vif,
son hoir le plus proche A lul succeder,' the concept of which is reproduced
in our article 724 by the words 'Legal heirs are seized of right .... ' On
the contrary, irregular successors, although invested by the death of the
deceased of, the ownership of the property, are not so invested with its
possession; it is necessary that they cause themselves to be judicially sent
into possession as is prescribed by the same article 724." 3 MARCADf, EXPLI-
CATION DU CODs Civu. no. 47, at 33 (7th ed. 1873).
13. See also LA. CIv. CODS art. 1292 which provides: "When a person, at
his decease, leaves several heirs, each of them becomes an undivided pro-
prietor of the effects of the succession .. " (Emphasis added.)
14. LA. COv. CODE art. 942 seems clearly to indicate that seizin means
constructive possession when it provides: "The heir being considered seized
of the succession from the moment of its being opened, the right of posses-
sion, which the deceased had, continues in the person of the heir, as if there
had been no interruption, and independent of the fact of possession." (Em-
phasis added)
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first two.15 This is the reason why under article 1607 of the
Civil Code, the universal legatee is required to demand the de-
livery of his legacy from the forced heirs, who, being "seized
of right" of the effects of the succession, are deemed to be in
"possession" thereof; that is why, under the provisions of article
1613, the legatee under a universal title is "bound to demand
the delivery of his legacy" first from the forced heirs and in
default of forced heirs, from "the universal legatees; and in
default of those, of the next heirs in the order established in the
title; Of Successions." This is also the reason why irregular
heirs, who have no seizin, must cause themselves to be sent into
possession of the "succession which has fallen to them. . .. "16
But the fact that the irregular heir has not caused himself to be
sent into possession does not mean that he cannot transmit to
his own heirs the inheritance that has fallen to him along with
the right that he had to demand the possession thereof if he
should die before having been sent into possession,17 The con-
clusion is, therefore, that under the scheme of the Louisiana Civil
Code, an heir, whether regular or irregular,18 acquires the own-
ership of his hereditary share by operation of law immediately
upon the death of the de oujus, but that the irregular heir can-
15. See LA. Civ. CoDE arts. 1607, 1609, 1613.
16. See LA. Civ. CoDE art. 925.
17. See LA. Civ. CoD art. 949. Under LA. Qv. COD art. 925, the irregular
heir is "permitted to take possession" of the succession which has "fallen to
[him]" (i.e., which he has inherited) only by the order of the court. It Is
suggested that he can only be "permitted" to take possession of that which
is already his; since the judgment of possession is merely a recognitive act
and not an act translative of ownership, Everett v. Clayton, 211 La. 211, 29
So.2d 769 (1947), the irregular heir can acquire nothing by the judgment
that was not already his.
18. It Is evident that under article 949, the Irregular heir transmits to his
own heir, not only the right of action to be sent into possession, but also
the right which he had in and to the succession itself. The article contains
the following language: "[B]ut they do not the less transmit their rights
to their heirs If they die before having made their demand to be put into
possession. The reason Is, that this sort of heirs, having only a right of
action to cause themselves to be put into possession of successions thus
falling to them, this right and this action form part of their succession,
which they transmit to their heirs." (Emphasis added.) It would be anomZ
alous indeed to say that all the heir transmits is his right of action, with-
out transmitting also the inheritance which has already devolved upon him
by operation of law under Civil Code articles 917-24.
It is therefore suggested that, had a proper analysis been made of these
articles of the Civil Code, the unfortunate expressions found in the juris-
prudence to the effect that the irregular heir "succeeds neither to the own-
ership nor to the possession" of the inheritance would not have been made:
Cf. Glen v. West, 151 La. 522, 92 So. 43 (1922); Succession of Wells, 184 La.
523, 166 So. 488 (1936); Wimberly v. King, 179 So. 515 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1938).
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not exercise any of the rights which the deceased had because
he has no seizin.
And so it is with the legatees in a testate succession who,
though not "seized of their legacies" nevertheless acquire the
ownership thereof, regardless of their nature, as of the date of
the testator's death by operation of law.19 In this respect article
1626 of the Civil Code could not be any more explicit.
With the abolition of "seizin" by article 3211 of the Code of
Civil Procedure20 under which the succession representative
"shall be deemed to have possession of all property of the suc-
cession and shall enforce all obligations in its favor," the regular
heir has been virtually placed in the same position as the ir-
regular heir who never had any seizin. It cannot be said, how-
ever, that because he no longer has the constructive possession
of the succession, that he does not acquire the ownership of his
hereditary share by operation of law the instant the de cujus
dies.
PENALTY CLAUSES
In Succession of KeMr, 2' the testator left a will in which,
after making several bequests, including a particular bequest of
$10,000 to the Crippled Children Hospital of New Orleans, he
bequeathed the residue of his property to his brothers and sis-
ters, providing, however, that the legacy to the hospital was to
be paid from the portion to be received by one of the sisters.22
19. LA. CIv. CoDs art. 1626.
20. The official comment by the redactors of this article is in part as
follows: "(a) This article is a departure from the law relating to seizin.
The utility of the concept of seizin in Louisiana law is doubtful, since as
a practical matter the succession representative has full seizin of all the
property of the deceased."
21. 252 So.2d 507 (La. App. 4th Cir.) writs denied, 259 La. 1050, 254 So.2d
462 (1971).
22. The disposition was as follows: "The balance of my estate I leave
to my brothers and sisters, except that $10,000 dollars of my sister, Beryl,
inheritance E[io] is to be given to the Crippled Children Hospital .... " Id.
at 509. It was contended that the meaning of this provision was that the
$10,000 legacy previously made to the hospital was to be paid first to the
sister who would then pay it to the hospital, and that it was, therefore, a
prohibited substitution. The court fairly interpreted the disposition as mean-
ing that the residuary legatees were to take the remainder of the testa-
tor's property, but that before the sister took her share, the $10,000 was to
be deducted and paid over to the hospital.
It is clear, nevertheless, that even if the plaintiff's interpretation had
been the proper one, the legacy would not have created a substitution pro-
hibited by article 1520 of the Civil Code because there was no double dis-
[Vol. 33
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The will also contained the following clause:
"I asked for no help in writing this will and I have re-
ceived none. Should it be challenged or protested, in any
way by any heir it becomes null and void and my entire
estate is to be given to the Crippled Children Hospital .... 28
A nephew of the de cujus, not included in the will, attacked
the dispositions in favor of the hospital contending, inter alia,
that the effect of the penalty clause was to create a prohibited
substitution with the hospital as the substitute. His specious
argument seemed to be that the named legatees would receive
their respective legacies and that then, upon his attack on the
will, over which the legatees had no control, the legacies would
devolve upon the hospital. The court took the position that an
analysis of the plaintiff's argument would have been futile, since
the penal clause in question was repugnant to law and therefore
considered as not written by application of article 1519 of the
Civil Code.
This appears to be the first time that the validity of penalty
clauses appearing in testaments is judicially considered, although
not completely explored. It is evident that the type of clause
involved in Kern was, to use the language of the court, "par-
ticularly vicious," in that a stranger was to reap the benefits of
a protest or challenge by a person not otherwise having any
interest in the will or in the dispositions it contained.2 4
There are other types of penalty clauses, however, by which
a testator, in an attempt to ensure the faithful execution of his
testament in every respect, prohibits an heir or legatee from
attacking all or any portion thereof under penalty of forfeiting
whatever benefits he would otherwise derive under the testa-
ment. In France, such clauses are reputed valid and enforceable
if the testamentary dispositions which the testator is seeking
to protect from attack are only of a private and pecuniary na-
ture; but they are reputed not written as being contrary to public
position in full ownership to one, to be preserved and rendered to another
at death. See Succession of Reilly, 136 La. 347, 67 So. 27 (1915). The dispo-
sition was more in the nature of a charge upon the legatee to pay over a
sum of money to another, which is valid. Succession of Michon, 30 La. Ann.
213 (1878).
23. Succession of Kern, 252 So.2d 507, 509 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
24. As the court pointed out, under such circumstances, the legatees
can be placed in contest against the beneficiary of the penal clause by the
simple act of anyone not a legatee in contesting the will in any manner.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33
order if they are intended as a means of giving effect to dispo-
sitions which are themselves illegal or against public policy, or if
intended to protect a will from attack which is otherwise null
for lack of form or for any other reason.25 In Kern, the court,
although holding the clause in question invalid as being against
public policy, seems to indicate that if the penalty had called
for the forfeiture of whatever benefits the unsuccessful attacker
would have derived under the will, the clause would have been
given effect, provided, of course, that the dispositions the testator




Weber v. Fidelity & Casualty Insurance Co.1 demonstrates
that the plaintiff in Louisiana who has suffered harm caused by
a defective product has a cause of action as effective as any
plaintiff enjoying the benefits of common law strict liability in
the products liability field. The facts in Weber are unique. Plain-
tiff's cattle were allegedly killed by an application of improperly
formulated cattle dip manufactured by defendant. Immediately
after the disaster, the plaintiff cattle owner interred both the
cattle and the ominous dip in a final resting place in the earth
soon covered by the concrete strip of a highway. Neither the
cattle nor the dip were available as evidence in the litigation.
The trial court gave judgment for the plaintiff; the court of
appeal reversed and gave judgment for the defendant; and the
25. Such would be the case, for example, where the clause is intended to
make effective dispositions to persons incapable of receiving or to give
effect to dispositions exceeding the disposable portion of the disposer, or
dispositions contained in testaments which are null as to form. 11 AuBRY
vT RAU VT ESMEIN, DROrI CrIVL FRANQAS § 692 (6th ed. 1954) in LAZARUS, 3
CriL LAw TRANSLA7TIONS 295 (1969); 3 COLIN ET CAPITANT ST D LA MORRAN-
DIkRS, CoURs I-LtMSNTAIRE DB DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIs no. 1402 (9th ed. 1945); 3
JOSSE AND, COUPS DI DROIT PosrnF FEANgAIS nos. 1548, 1549 (1933). For a dis-
cussion of the problem, generally, see Brown, Protsions Forbidding Attack
in a Will, 4 TuL. L. Rrv., 421 (1930).
26. "If the clause in question were restricted to protests or challenges
by the legatees receiving a benefit from the will, there would be little prob-
lem in the absence of forced heirs. However, the clause in question prohibits
protests by 'any heir,' whether or not he is a party to the will or benefits
thereby. Under the circumstances, the legatees are virtually helpless and
at the mercy of any heir not mentioned in the will." 252 So.2d at 50.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 259 AL. 599, 250 So.2d 754 (1971).
